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SECURITY IN AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS 
ABSTRACT 
Security in automatic data processing systems is concerned 
with the protection of equipment and data against unauthorized 
modifications or destruction, and accidental or intentional 
disclosure of information. 
This report consists of two parts: 
1. An overview of current literature in the field. In this 
part, basic problems and solutions, terminology and concepts found 
in the theoretical aspects of d~ta processing systems security are 
described. 
2. A survey of the state of the art in a sample area. 
During the survey, infonnation about actual applications of security 
methods in the Orlando, Florida area was collected. This 
information was gathered by means of a questionnaire and it will 
permit a comparative analysis between the usage of security 
measures in large and small firms. 
It is hoped that this study will provide valuable information 
to both the computer practitioner and management and in addition, 
will create an awareness of the important role that the security 
function plays in an organization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The use of computer systems has grown to the extent that 
they have become a critical and indispensable resource in today's 
society. 
There is a widespread use of automatic data processing 
technology by a large number of organizations. 
Some examples of computer users are: The Department of 
Defense, The Internal Revenue Service, The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the banking industry, insurance companies, health 
institutions, colleges and universities, manufacturing and 
retailing businesses. 
The demand for computer systems is growing rapidly as new 
technological advances permit the marketing of a large variety of 
electronic .processing equipment. Some facts on this growth are 
shown on Table 1 and Figure 1. 
In addition to the increase in computer utilization, there 
has been an increase in crime in our society. The cost of 
'ordinary• crimes against business had reached $23.6 billion in 
1975. (U. S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion ~ 1973, p.7). Crime can affect businesses regardless of 
location, although the incidence varies by the type of area. The 
growth of crime is described in Figures 2, 3 and 4. 
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Fig. 1. Installed Dollars In Computing Equipment 
1967-1973 
SOURCE: U. S. Department of Commerce, Domestic and 
International Business Administration, Bureau of Domestic 
Commerce, U. S. Industrial Outlook 1973, with Projections 
to 1980 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 
1973), p.321. 
9 
9 
-. -
~ 
SERIOUS CRIMES 
1 6 !:ACH .~INUTE: 
l z 
6 
FORCIBlE RAPE 
l 
3 
ONE EV~AY 1 Q MINUTe:S 
IZ 
5 
BURGlARY 
J 
ONE EVE:RY 1 2 SEC:JNOS 
' 2 
6 
VIOLENT CRIMES 
MUitDII. JOtiCltLI R.APf. 
•oaauy 0'1 .I.SS.AIJU TO .CIU. 
l 
Ol'lE e:vEP.Y 3 6 SECCNOS 
!2 
9 l 
6 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
I 
ONE c:ve:Rv 7 6 se:coNos · ' 
12 
9 l 
LARCENY· THEFT 
ONE C:VERY 7 SECONOS 
9 
IZ 
0 
MURDER 
4 
ONE S:VERY 2 7 MINUi~S 
ROBBERY 
ONE C:VERY 8 2 S£CONCS 
I Z 
9 
AUTO THEFT 
ONS: C:VC:RY 3 4 SS:CONO$ 
Fig. 2. Crime Clocks 1973 
SOURCE: U. S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Crime In The United States. 1973. Uniform 
Crime Reports (\~as hi ngton, D. c.: Government Pri nt1 ng Off1 ce, 
1973), p. ix. 
PERCENT CHANOE OV ER i968 
CRIME::: CRI·'WE INDEX OFFENSE$ 
CRIME RATE = NIJMSER OF OFFENSES PER 100.000 INHABITANTS 
+ 6or-----~------~------~------------~ 
+ so.-----~------~------~----~------~ 
+ 40~. --------------------~------------~ 
I 
I 
. 
+Jo~: ------------~------~------~----~ 
~;- i I l I 
I I I ~ •••••• 
·················•··········r····· 1 o~~~·~·~· ·~·~··~·~· --~,-------- ~· ------~~ ------~1 
. 1958 1969 1970 197l 1972 1973 
5 
CRIME RATe 
UP 24Yo 
POPULATION 
UP 5~. 
Fig. 3~ _Crime and Population 1968-1973. 
SOURCE: U. S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Crirre in the United States. 1973. Uniform Crime 
Reports, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), 
p. 3. 
CRffv\ES AGAINST PROPERTY 
1968-1973 
PERCENT CHANGe OVER 196S 
UMITEO TO BURGLARY. L..\RCENY -THEFT .. ~NO AUTO THE" 
-·1968 ·- -1969- - 1970 - 1971 1972 1973 
6 
PROP£~TY CRIME 
UP 28~ 
Fig. 4. Crime Against Prop~rty 1968-1873. 
SOURCE: U. S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau 
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1973), p.S. 
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This high level and variety of crime could not leave the 
field of computer applications untouched. A number of incidents 
involving au~qm~ted information systems is found in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
COMPUTER RELATED CRIMES 
1964-1972 
Category of Incident No. of Incidents 
Sabotage 
Theft 
Copying (Data) 
Tampering 
Masquerading 
Fraudulent Activities 
15 
23 
8 
23 
2 
5 
76 
SOURCE: Ruth M. Davis, 11 Privacy and Security 
in Data Systems, .. Computers and People 23 
(March 1974): 25. 
If the three factors discussed above (increasing computer 
usage, crime and computer related incidents) are considered and 
analyzed, it can be easily concluded that the need for security in 
data and computer systems has become increasingly important. 
The evolution of the computer from a laboratory curiosity, 
to a prestigious luxury, to a vitally necessary administrative tool 
8 
has brought with it many problems in the areas of security, 
accuracy and privacy. 
The probTem ·of computer security has also been changing in 
nature. Early systems could have been provided with a large 
degree of protection by strict physical security procedures. The 
computer could have been made basically secure by virtue of the 
fact that the entire system could have been placed behind a well 
guarded wall, thereby restricting access to the machine for input 
and output with relative ease. 
As computer systems have grown more sophisticated and varied, 
and time-sharing operation, telecommunications, multiprograrrming, 
and mass-storage devices have become available, new security 
procedures have been needed. However, it is not enough to simply 
furnish security measures. Measures should not only minimize risk 
and probability of loss, but should be available at a reasonable 
cost. 
Important decisions about costs and risks must now be faced 
by management and it must become aware of the general problems and 
solutions of the data processing security areas. 
A trade-off between the degree of protection and cost is now 
essential in that a great deal of computer security can be provided 
with today's technology but only at a significant cost. 
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Management should understand the basic concepts and threats 
to the information proeessing system in order to approve and direct 
the implementatton of security procedures. 
CHAPTER I 
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND PROCEDURE 
The objectives of this report are: 
10 
1. To acquaint the reader with some basic concepts 
and terms found in the field of computer security. 
2. To describe the most common threats to 
electronic data processing applications. 
3. To present a set of basic general solutions 
available to countermand the possible threats. 
4. To discuss the weaknesses found in existing 
firms and recommend possible solutions. 
The scope of the report will be limited to five areas of 
analysis: personnel, physical, backup, develop~ent,and data 
programs and documentation. Within each one of these areas the 
following will be discussed; general security problems, general 
guidelines (or procedures), the questionnaire used for the survey, 
the results obtained and an analysis of those results. 
The procedure followed to accomplish the proposed objectives 
consists of two parts: 
1. An overview of current literature in the 
computer and data security area. From this 
study, basic concepts, threats and general 
guidelines are obtained for later discussion . 
11 
2. A survey of actual applications of security 
methods was performed. This information was 
gathereo by means of a questionnaire and it will 
permit a comparative analysis between the usage 
of computer security procedures in large and 
s rna 11 f i nns • 
12 
CHAPTER II 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The desired end product of the four objectives stated in 
Chapter I is a set of countermeasures that will penmit the proper 
functioning of the data processing system. 
Proper functioning is defined as the satisfactory completion 
of all necessary and desirable functions of the data processing 
application. 
The applications should be performed without the loss of any 
data, the introduction of errors, or permitting data to be read 
or modified with no authorization. 
To accomplish the desired level of functioning, a variety of 
preventive, protective, recovery and detection procedures should 
be applied. These are the types of measures that will be discussed 
in this report. 
The need for these various measures can be summarized as 
follows: 
a) The probability of a hazardous event happening 
at all should be minimized and the actions taken 
should be preventive. 
b) Controls should be designated to detect and 
minimize the damage of threat if it does occur. 
The preventive actions will not always work, 
therefore, it is necessary to protect the 
personnel, hardware and software from the 
harm -tnat could result. 
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c) Designing a method of recovery from damage 
is vital to the overall security plan. If 
damage has occurred, there must be plans to 
make a quick recovery possible. 
It is the responsibility of management to concern itself with 
the safeguarding of resources under its jurisdiction, and to 
organize, control and direct both human and capital resources. 
It is important to recognize that there are no simple 
formulas for examining the oost-value trade-offs in applying data 
security measures. 
The security procedures for any given system or installation 
are unique to its specific needs. There is not a prescribed set of 
rules that can guarantee complete security for all conditions. 
The decision t c i~plement any given set of data security 
techniques must be related to the degree of vulnerability of the 
computer, the value of the data in question, the policy guidelines 
and natmosphere of concern 11 provided by general management. 
Types of security exposure organized under six classifications 
(Acts of God, har'dware and program failures, human carelessness, 
malicious damage, crime and invasion of privacy) are presented in 
Table 3. This type of table is an example that can be used to 
define the different types of threats to which the computer system 
14 
rr.ay be exposed. 
A graphical description of the interrelationships between 
threats and ltrres of defense is presented in Figure 5. The nucleus 
of the methodology for control of security and accuracy lies in the 
design of the computer system and its programs, but it is important 
to consider that a set of layers of control are necessary to 
improve the protection against different types of threats . 
.. 
It is common to hear or read stories about computers making 
phenomenal and sometimes pitiful errors. A brief presentation of 
the seven most common causes of errors may be found in Figure 6. 
To maintain accuracy and security in a computer system the 
rate of errors must be minimized. 
It is extremely important to recognize the possible threats 
and estimate the probability of occurrence in order to design th.e 
necessary countermeasures. 
ACTS OF GOD 
Fire 
Flood 
Act of War 
Other Catastrophe 
{ 
TABLE 3 
---
TYPES OF SECURITY EXPOSURE 
HARDWARE AND PROGRAM FAILURES 
Computer outage 
File unit damages disk track 
Tape unit damages part of tape 
Disk, or other volume, unreadable 
Hardware/Software error damages file 
Data Transmission error not detected 
Card (or other input) chewed up by machine 
Error in application program damages record 
HUMAN CARELESSNESS 
Keypunch errors 
Terminal operator input error 
Wrong volume mounted & updated 
Wrong version of program used 
Accident during program testing 
Mislaid tape or disk 
Physical damage to tape of disk · 
MALICIOUS DAMAGE 
Looting 
Violent Sabotage 
Nonviolent sabotage (e.g. tape erasure) 
Malicious computer operator 
(. 15 
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TABLE 3 - Continued 
MALICIOUS DAMAGE - continued 
Malicious prograrnrrer 
Malicious tape librarian 
Malicious terminal ooerator 
Malicious· user (e.g.· punches holes in 
returnable card) . 
Playful malignancy (e.g. using terminal 
for fun) 
CRIME 
Embezzlement 
Industrial espionage 
Employees selling commercial secrets 
Employees selling data for mailing lists 
Data-bank information used for bribery 
or extortion 
INVASION OF PRIVACY 
Casual curiosity (e.g. salaries) 
Looking up data for a competing corporation 
Obtaining personal information for 
political or legal reasons 
Nondeliberate revealing of private info 
Malicious invasion of privacy 
16 
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SOURCE: James Martin, Security, Accuracy, and Privacy in 
Computer Systems (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prenti ce-Hall~ 
19 73) ' pp. 12-13. 
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Fig. 5. Threats and Their Usual Defense. 
SOURCE: AFIPS Systems Review Manual on Security 
(Montvale, New Jersey: American Federation of Information 
Processing Societies, 1975), p.9 
feel. mow 
M1schicC 
~.t.mult 
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HARDWARE ERRORS 
Yt:ry infrequent. Hardware can be designed to 
detc:c.:t victually all its own errors. 
S(JFTWARE ERRORS 
Especially in new sofrware 
that has had little "field" testing. A nuisance but not 
a major cause of ~rrors in output. 
Fig. 6. 
ERRORS IN APPLICATION PROGRA\IS 
The usual cause of wild behavior in a 
computer system. The cure: thorough 
program testing. 
OPERATOR ERRORS 
For example, an operator incomctly recovering 
from a card jam or other failure. 
Solution: foolproof operating procedures.. 
--- DATA-INPUT ERRORS 
"Garbage in: Garbage out. Cause: 
errors in keypunching. terminal entry or 
orher manual input ; use of wrong data. 
Necessary: keypunch verification, input 
controls, accuracy tests. Faulty input is the 
biggest cause of ucomputer errors,. 
INAPPROPRIATE PROGRA\1 DESIGN 
Invalid decision-making process. Ne~ect of important 
pai6Uneten. For example: inappropriate method of 
setting overbooking limits in an airline may result in 
passengers being stranded at the airport. 
QUESTIONABLE SYSTE.'1 PHILOSOPHY 
For example:. the system is insuificiently tlexible to h3ndJc unanticipated 
events; the system methodology imposes undesirable constraints 
on the operuting environment ~ the effects of invalid data 
are acted upon without a double ~heck (e.g., consumer's 
electricity is incorrec[ly cut oft). 
Sources of Computer Errors 
SOURCE: James Martin, Security, Accuracy, and Privacy 
in Comouter Systems (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1973), p. 23. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEFINITION OF A FEW GENERAL TERMS 
Before stating soJ~ of the most desirable conditions in a 
security program for an automatic data processing facility, it is 
important to define some basic concepts such as: security, privacy, 
confidentiality and anonymity. 
1) Security refers to the protection against unauthorized 
., 
disclosure, destruction or modification of (1) data, (2) software, 
(3) hardware, whether intentionally caused or resulting from 
accident or carelessness. 
A brief descriptjon of what security means is given in 
Davis 1974, p. 21. 
Data .security is the protection of data against accidental 
of intentional destruction, disclosure or modification 
using both physical security measures and controlled 
accesibility. Physical security as it pertains to computers, 
does not differ from physical security for other 
installations. It is achieved through the use of locks, 
guards, badges, personnel security clearances and 
administratively controlled measures outside the computer 
as well as measures required for the protection of the 
structures housing the computer and related equipment 
against damage from accident, fire and environmental 
hazard, thus ensuring the protection of their contents. 
Controlled accessibility is the set of technological 
measures of hardware and software available in a computer 
system for the protection of data. 
20 
2) Privacy relates to the rights of individuals and 
organizations to determine for themselves when, how and to what 
extent information about them is to be transmitted to others. 
As stated in AFIPS Systems Review Manual on Security 
1975' p. 2. ' 
Privacy is therefore primarily a matter of an individual's 
personal concern with respect to information that may or 
may not Pe collected or divulged about himself or his affairs. 
Privacy is thus a matter of individual rights defined by 
public policy, court decisions, and legal statutes, 
ordinances, or regulations. 
3) Confidentiality is a concept that deals with data, 
specifically it refers to the degree of protection which will be 
provided to minimize potential invasions of privacy. 
·As described in AFIPS Systems Review Manual on Security 
1975, p.2. 
Confidentiality involves relationships or agreements 
between the sources of information and the collectors, 
diseminators, or users of that information. It is a 
matter of protection of privacy (or of other constraints 
upon disclosure, distribution, or use of sensitive 
information). The area of confidentiality, rather than 
that of privacy per se, is thus the primary concern for 
system designers, systems managers, operators, users 
and evaluators. 
4) Anonymity is a term which is described by Mosmann 1976, 
p. 170. 
To attempt to hide publicly known facts, to remove or 
obscure such facts from the historical records {forget 
what has taken place in public, to erase the record, to 
decline to report). 
Our anonymity has been protected when it has been 
protected at all -by inefficiencies of record keeping, 
and is attacked by efficiency and computer technology. 
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These general concepts implicitly suggest that any data 
processing mechanism {being it manually or automatically operated) 
needs some kind of protective measures. These set of protective 
measures imply a multistage problem that will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
22 
CHA T R IV 
THE STUDY AND RESULTS 
I troduct1on and Bas1c Framework 
Although a prescription of specific security measures cannot 
be defined for all organizations, the literature in the field 
provides enough guidelines and information about security procedures 
to build a basic theoretical framework. 
These general guidelines contain the type of technical 
measures that will tend to minimize the risk of violating the data 
integrity and security in data processing systems. 
The basic structure is formed by five sections or important 
categories of control: Personnel, Physical, Backup, Development, 
and Data, Programs and Documentation. These general sections will 
be subdivided by specific areas of operation: 
'A. Personnel 
General Management 
Exit Policies 
Employee Identification 
Vendor Hiring Policies 
5, Hiring Policies 
B. 
c. 
D. 
E. 
--------- 1 • 
Physical =------- 2. 
-.- 3. 
Backup 1 . 
Deve·lopment 
----1. 
Data, Programs 
& Documentation 
23 
Access Controls 
Protection Equipment 
Housekeeping 
Backup and Fall-back 
Program Development Procedures 
Data and Programs Access 
& Control 
2. Logs & Instructions 
Discussions and analysis will be organized by subsections as 
presented above. ·The questionnaire used in the survey was 
designed to collect information about each of the areas of 
operation mentioned 'above and it is described in more detail in 
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
The survey consisted of eight companies (five small firms 
and three large ones) in the Orlando, Florida area. The prime 
criterion used to differentiate between small and large 
organizations was the total monthly rental for the computer system. 
A computer user who pays less than $10,000 per month for rental of 
the computer system is considered a small organization and vice 
versa if the user pays more than $10,000. 
The questionnaire was filled out by means of personal inter-
views. The person being interviewed (Security officer or data 
24 
processing manager) in each case was asked to answer the questions 
as accurately as possible, it was also guaranteed that the identity 
of the company anq _the answers given will be kept completely 
confidential .. 
Personnel Section 
Statement of The Problem 
The basic protection of a data processing system begins with 
the integrity of people that have access to the hardware, software 
or handle any data. 
A comment about the importance of personnel is found in 
AFIPS Systems Review Manual on Security 1975, p.l2. 
In the end, preservation of privacy rests not with machines 
but with men. The effectiveness of all protective measures, 
however sophisticated they may become, will still depend 
upon people: operators, service personnel, supervising 
officers, and all those who decide what information to put 
into a computer and how . to use it. 
The basic approach to maintain security in this area is to 
hire honest people, orient personnel on company•s security 
procedures and design controls to minimize temptations. 
General Guidelines 
· In order to maintain an acceptable level of control over 
personnel, the following measures are indispensable: 
A. Personal and employment references, qualifications and 
skills of all applicants should be thoroughly checked. 
B. Special orientation and training programs should be 
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provided where employees are found to be deficient in necessary 
qualifications and skills. 
C. All empl-oyees should be thoroughly indoctrinated with the 
policies and practices of the organization, especially with respect 
to matters of confidentiality and security. 
D. As small a number of people as possible should be 
entrusted with matters involving confidentiality and security. 
E. Management should establish a protection program for 
employees against damage or injury, attack, and bribery or coercion. 
A safe environment must be engineered to assure the safety of the 
workforce. 
F. Employees critically engaged in the handling or processing 
of sensitive or privileged information should be bonded, licensed, 
and/or certified. 
G. Refresher sessions on security, confidentiality and 
protection of privacy should be held with all responsible personnel 
at regular periodic intervals. 
H. Suspension and termination procedures must be carefully 
designed and conscientiously applied. 
I . Suoervisors should maintain close and effective 
' 
communications with their staffs. They should try to be sensitive 
to feelings and attitudes so that they can act affirmatively in 
cases of potential dissatisfaction, suspicious behavior or unusual 
attitudes, work habits and life style. 
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J. One individual should never be totally responsible for a 
given activity especially if it relates to the processing or 
developwent of sensitive applications. 
K. The employee morale should be kept high, to accomplish 
this, programs such as: fringe benefits, educational and 
professional development, stock options, adequate work spaces, 
parking areas and suggestion boxes, should be considered. 
L. ~special screening procedure should be available to 
check personal and employment records of: consultants, part-time 
and temporary employees, maintenance, service ~nd janitorial 
personnel. 
The Personnel Section Questionnaire 
This section of the questionnaire is directed to collecting 
information about personnel policies and procedures, pre- and 
post-employment investigation, general management involvement in 
the design and revisions of security systems, and a definition of 
the most likely confidentiality/securi.ty threats to the organizat i on~ 
as seen in Figure 4. 
Analysis of the Results 
From the results obtained in this study, it can be easily 
seen that large organizations use a high percentage of protective 
and control measures in the personnel area .. A bit more of manage-
ment involvement in security matters and publication of emergency 
plans is desired to have better coordination. 
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Small companies could augment their security measures in this 
area without increasing their expenditures very much. 
If an organizat.ion cannot afford a full-time security officer 
or if it is not economical then a systems analyst(s) or a staff 
member(s) related to data processing can be appointed security 
officer(s) and safety committee as part of his/their responsibilities. 
Once an assignment is made and somebody has been appointed 
responsible for the development and implementation of security 
measures then a security program can be started. 
Managers, supel"visors and employees within the fi·rm can be 
asked for suggestions about protective, preventive and detection 
measures . . This is one way to collect information and get the 
employees and principally management involved with security matters. 
Inexpensive measures that will increase control and 
protection can be implemented in both small and large companies, 
although the study results show that only a relatively low per-
centage of small companies are using them. Some of the measures 
that can be taken are: posting and publication of emergency plans, 
issuing of employee identification cards, orientation about 
regulations and policies, form that clearly states that any 
misrepresentation will cause immediate dismissal, photograph taken 
to become part of personnel record and dismissal interviews. 
1 . 
1 . 1 • 
1 . 2. 
1. 3. 
1 . 4 • . 
1 . 5. 
1 . 6. 
1.6.1. 
1.6.2. 
1.6.3. 
1.6.4. 
1.6.5. 
1.6.6. 
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TABLE 4 
PERSONNEL SECTION COMPARISON OF RESPONSES 
- . 
% OF 
LARGE QUESTION FIRMS 
GENERAL MANAGEMENT 
Is there a Security Official responsible 100 
for developing and controlling security 
programs? 
Is there an active safety committee which 100 
searches out and arranges elimination of 
safety hazards common to most commercial 
and industrial environments? 
Are security policies, procedures and 67 
programs formally reviewed by management? 
How often? 
Are names and telephone numbers of key 100 
personne 1 to be called in case of 
emergency clearly posted in all critical 
areas? 
Are published copies and revisions of 67 
emergency and disaster plans distributed 
to all management personnel responsible 
for the execution of security and recovery 
actions in case of a disaster? 
What are the most likely sources of threat 
to the confidentiality/security of the 
system? 
i ) Industrial espionage? 33 
ii) Malicious damage or theft of 33 
information? 
iii) Accidental invasion of privacy? 33 I 
iv) Fraud or embezzlement? I 67 I 
v) Hardware or program fai l ures? I 67 
vi) Accidental damages? , 33 
I 
I 
I 
_ l 
11 YES" 
SMALL 
FIRMS 
20 
40 
40 
40 
20 
0 
0 
I 20 
! 40 I 
I 60 ! 
60 
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TABLE 4--continued 
% OF 11 YES 11 
LARGE SMALL QUESTION FIRMS FIRMS 
2. EXIT POLICIES 
2. 1. Are interviews conducted upon dismissal 100 
of employee in order to recover identi-
fication cards, keys, records and 
manuals, collect and observe any hostile 
reactions? When is employee informed of 
termination? 
3. EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION 
3. 1 . 
3.2. 
4. 
·1s photograph of job applicant taken 
i~mediately upon employment to become 
part of personnel record? 
Are employee identification cards issued 
and if so, do they include: recent 
photograph, signature, issuing date, 
means of preventing alteration? 
VENDOR HIRING POLICIES 
100 
67 
4.1. Are there adequate security procedures 
for: 
4.1.1. 
4.1.2. 
4. 1. 3. 
5. 
5. 1 . 
5.2. 
5.3. 
5.4 
i) Maintenance employees? 
ii) Janitorial personnel? 
iii) Temporary employees and 
consultants? 
HIRING POLICIES 
100 
100 
100 
Does employment application form clearly 100 
indicate that any misrepresentation, 
falsification or withhoiding of 
information will cause for dismissal at 
any time after employment? 
Are the applicant•s personal and employ- 100 
ment references checked by means of 
personal meetings, telephone or mail? 
Does pre-employment investigation include 33 
a criminal records check? 
Are new employees given through brief- 100 
ings (orientation) on the policies, 
regulations, and practices of the organ. 
20 
0 
0 
20 
20 
60 
40 
60 
0 
40 
Physical Section 
Statement of The Problem 
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In order to p_roperly discuss the threats with which the 
physical security measures deal, it is necessary to classify them 
into four categories: 
• 
Natural disasters 
Manmade disasters 
Unauthorized access 
Hardware and utility failures 
Each one of these categories will be further subdivided into 
specific areas. It is important however, to understand that many 
of the problem areas are interrelated to each other, and that 
improvement of security in one type of threat may result in 
improvement of other problem areas. As can be seen in Figure 7, t he 
threats and remedial measures are interdependent. 
Physical security should be of concern not only for critical 
areas such as the data processing room and volume library, but for 
every aspect of system development and operation. 
31 
s::: 
·o I 
.,_;. 
" 
of.) 
~ -ra 
c: r-
lor- <lJt: ..- u (/) >o ttS .,... 0') 
-
~ QJ•r- c: of.)£: 
- - 0 ~of.) .,... Q;•r-QJ s.. I u E c:c.. .c: of.) co ,,....... ~ C') c. 
,....§- «+- ~~s.. QJ ttSO QJ QJ 
" c:: ~....., ...., ...., ES... ttSS... 0') .J::. Cl•r- t:V1 r- o-o 
t:.f-) ItS +J co.. -Q) QJ (])~ S...U) 0(1) of.) 1-r- 0 ""0 -o +->ttS +JQJ 
.,.. ~ 0 f'Q >,o .,_ OV1 U> 
COUNTER-MEASURES of.) of.) .0 of-) c..s::: us.. EV1 <lJttS ttSttS ItS ttS OVl uo <lJC'CJ r-QJ :zu U') 0 u c:( 0::: LJJ 
Physical barriers X X X X X X 
Guards, badges X X X X X 
Passwords, fingerprints 
Voice, signature, etc. X X 
Encrypting of data X X X 
EM filters, shields X X 
Auditing, checks and balances X X X X 
Threat monit·oring X X X 
Quality software, data 
protection, bounds control X X X X X X 
Personnel screening, 
Motivation X X X X 
Terminal access controls X X X X X 
File access controls X X X X X 
Data copies in safe storage X X 
Backup support equipment X X 
Fig. 7. Threats and Countermeasures 
SOURCE: Ruth M·. Davis, "Privacy and Security in Data 
Systems, .. Computers and People 23 (March 1974): 25 
Natural Disasters 
Definition of The Threat 
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Natural disasters ()r Acts of God are a type of threat in 
which human intervention is non existent. The security planner has 
no control over the occurrence of these threats and the best 
measures will be the ones that will minimize the damage caused if a 
disaster should happen. Some of the threats that can be classified 
under natural disasters are: 
1 • Windstorm 6. Explosion 
2. Hurricane 7. Flood 
3. Tornado 8. Lightning 
4. Earthquake 9. Ice and Snow 
5. Fire 10. Rain and Mud 
All of these events tend to have the same basic effects on 
data processing applications: complete or partial destruction of 
the facility and its contents and therefore, interruption of normal 
operations. They also represent a threat to the health and lives 
of the personnel. Security and protection in this field can be 
obtained by maintaining acces.s controls; fire alarm, prevention and 
extinguishing systems; general safety and surveillance activities. 
General Guidelines 
Some general protective measures can be taken to minimize 
damage in the event of disaster: 
A. An analysis of frequencies and damages caused by windstorms, 
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hurricanes and tornadoes in the region where the computer center is 
located. Information can be obtained from the local National 
Weather Service Office and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration. 
B. A study and plan should be implemented to protect the 
facilities against structural damage, flooding and loss of 
electric power due to high winds, earthquake or explosion. 
C. The selection of the building: structural resistance 
and its location is of prime importance. 
D. Emergency procedures should be available in case of 
interruption of transportation, supporting utilities and other vital 
services. 
E. The security planner and systems analyst(s) should be 
aware of power characteristics: quality and reliability. 
F. There should be measures to insure prompt detection of 
fire (heat and smoke detectors), adequate means and personnel to 
limit damage and assure prompt recovery. Some of the most common 
extinguishing mechanisms are: 
i ) 
i i ) 
i i i } 
iv) 
Portable or hand extinguishers 
Hose lines 
Automatic sprinkler systems (water) 
Volume extinguishment systems (HALON- 1301, 
Carbon dioxide - co2-) 
G. Combustible materials should be kept in safe places where 
they cannot be easily ign i ted and there is not likely to be a source 
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of ignition. 
H. The building and the equipment in it can be better 
protected if the de~i_gn and construction of the building is safe: 
the structure of the building is constructed o~ non-combustible 
materials; there are low-flame-spread materials for floors, walls 
and furniture; fire walls; stairwells, dampers or shutters in ducts. 
I. Safety programs should be regularly offered to employees. 
J. Documentation, cards, magnetic tapes and disks should be 
kept in water and fireproof vaults when not being used. 
K. It is prudent to consider some· countenneasures if the 
flooding exposure is highly probable: emergency pumps, drains, 
sandbags and masonry curbs. 
L. An analysis of electric power line fluctuations and the 
effect of these in the hardware is necessary. Some fluctuations 
caused by lightning may generate logic errors, erroneous data 
transfer and even damage the hardware. 
Man Made Disasters and Unauthorized Access 
Definition of the Threats 
Man made disasters are those in which human beings are 
responsible for the occurrence of a catastrophe. 
The problem of unauthorized access can be discussed together 
wi.th man made disasters because many of the preventive measures are 
common to both· threats. 
Most of the plans. designed to minimize damage and recovery 
in the event of a natural disaster are also applied against man 
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made disasters. It is important to recognize that human beings are 
behind the occurrence of a catastrophe in these types o'f threats. 
It is to be e~pe~ted that intruders will find a way to 
penetrate the protected areas if enough time and resources are 
available to them and the rewards are of sufficient magnitude to 
- I 
make such access attractive. -rhus·; one thing to keep in mind at 
the time of designing the security measures is that the cost of 
obtaining some information or causing damage to the data processing 
system should be more expensive than the value of the information 
obtained or the damage caused. 
General Guidelines 
Protection measures against man made disasters are: 
A. The best possible site for a computer complex would be an 
isolated one. The more remote a site is and the less cover 
available, the easier it is to control the access. Flat, wideopen, 
unpopulated spaces make identification of authorized or unauthorized 
persons simple. 
B. The air conditioning system should be entirely self-
contained and not linked to any other area; there should be no 
exte·rnal access to ventilation systems or insurgents may be able to 
introduce various noxious or toxic gases. 
' C. There should be only one door for regular access to the 
data processing center. Any other doors for fire escape purposes 
should be kept 1 ocked from inside, it should not be possible to 
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open them from the outside; internal keys should be kept behind 
break-glass panels. It may be possible to use push-bar escape 
doors. 
D. A perimeter barrier (wall or fence), guards and patrols, 
electronic burglar detectors, secure windows, strong locked doors, 
reinfor·ced roofs, burglar-proof safes and store rooms, and others 
are possible protective mechanisms that the security planner must 
consider. 
E. There are many electronic innovations available to protect 
the computer center against intruders, some of these are: light 
beam (or laser, ultraviolet or infrared radiation), magnet 
detectors, ultrasonic and radar detectors, closed-circuit television, 
theft detectors, magnetic strip and card readers, time-lapse 
cameras and electronic combination locks. 
F. When evaluating the potential threats, it is necessary to 
estimate the likely level of effort the intruder might be willing 
to exert to achieve his goal. Some of the threats may come from: 
common criminals, activists, espio~age agents, vandals, riot, 
strikes, sabotage and mischief. 
G. The following areas constitute a minimum set to be 
analyzed to determine permissible access) both during operational 
periods and when the facility is closed: computer room, data 
storage library, input/output area~ data conversion area, 
programmer at'eas, document 1 ibrary, corrmuni cations equipment area, 
computer maintenance room, mechanical equipment room, telephone 
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closet and supplies storage. 
H. The security planner should consider the human resources 
available to support xhe physical protection plan. In addition to 
full-time guards, the following people may, as permitted by regular 
duties, be able to participate: receptionists and information desk 
personnel, building and grounds maintenance staff, shipping and 
receiving clerks, messengers, area supervisors and mail room 
personnel. 
I. Access controls cannot be too stringent because this 
could inhibit the smooth operation of the shop, frustrate loyal 
employees and cause bright employees to seek some way to circumvent 
the system. A lax set of controls tends to indirectly authorize 
employees access to data which may satisfy their curiosity, but it 
is not part of their jobs. 
J. Precious files should be identified with specially colored 
labels and they will be kept under more rigorous control than the 
regular files. 
Hardware and Utility Failures 
Statement of The Problem 
The typical computer system is composed of many interconnected 
units which perform the functions necessary to perform its assigned 
data processing tasks. 
The computer, its various peripherals and the electric power 
necessary to keep these units running will fail occasionally. The 
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failure of any element would halt operations if specific measures 
are not taken. The reliability that has been engineered into the 
system will deter~ina.how often failures will occur. 
General Guidelines 
To maintain a basic understanding of utilities and hardware 
failures, the following actions are nscessary: 
A. The designer of the accuracy and security procedures must 
consider all the possible categories of failure and decide the 
proper course of action if each occurs. 
B. It is not desirable to start a long-run again if a computer 
failure occurs. Therefore, the run is divided into short segments 
and at the end of each segment a check-point is taken, meaning 
that enough data has been recorded to restart the run at that point. 
C. The typical automatic data processing procurement will 
include standards of performance demonstration required for the 
acceptance of a system. 
D. An analysis of the loss potential based on estimates of 
failure rates and repair times, will permit the automatic data 
processing security planner to identify those hardware units where 
failures will be most critical to operations. Additionally, it 
will serve as the basis for cost justification of remedial measures, 
a guide for development of a contingency plan and as an aid in 
future procurement decisions. 
E. The automatic data processing (ADP) security planner 
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should be aware of the following alternatives: 
Incorporate one or more additional units of 
a given -type beyond the minimum required to 
have a stand-by type of situation. 
Use a substitute technique or alternate 
procedure. 
Install two or more computers which as a 
group can handle the normal work load. If 
one computer fails, only the least critical 
tasks will be interrupted. 
Install several identically configured 
computers so that either system can perform 
all assigned tasks. -This approach may be 
used only for extremely critical or high risk 
missions. 
F. Establish adequate policy and procedures for management 
of hardware maintenance. Effective maintenance management should 
include: 
Determine the optimum schedule and scope of 
preventive maintenance. 
Report and perform statistical analysis on 
hardware failures so as to detect significant 
failure trends and take remedial measures on 
a timely basis. 
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Remedial maintenance should also receive 
continuing attention. Efforts to reduce 
the mean·time of repair should be cost 
effective. 
G. There must be procedures to handle operations when the 
failure of the computer system is partial. The system may be able 
to give a degraded form of service; when a component goes out, an 
alternative means of processing should be available. 
Some important terms for the systems planner are the following: 
Fallback: The system modifies its mode of operation 
to circumvent the error. 
Fail softly: ·The system uses alternative means of 
processing rather than collapsing 
completely in the eV~ent that a 
component goes out. 
Bypass procedure: Standby procedure that enables the 
regular continuation of critical 
operations without assistance from 
the computer. 
H. System controls should not allow errors or security 
vi o 1 ati ons dur'i ng the periods of di ffi cul ty when fa i 1 ures are 
encountered. 
I. Computer and terminal operators must be carefully 
trained tn what to do wh~n failures occur. They must be able to 
initiate the fallback and recovery action. 
41 
J. The ADP security planner should consider the probability 
of occurrence and the consequences in the event of failure of the 
following supporting -utilities: electric power, air conditioning, 
communi cations, water, e.levators and general supplies. 
Description of The Physical Area Questionnaire 
This section includes facility access controls for visitors 
and employees, guarding and surveillance activities, fire 
prevention, alanm systems, maintenance and safety, as seen in 
Table 5. 
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TABLE 5 
---
PHYSICAL SECTION COMPARISON OF RESPONSES 
% OF 11 YES II 
LARGE SMALL QUESTION FIRMS FIRMS 
1 . ACCESS CONTROLS 
B.l..l. If badges do not have means to prevent 100 0 
alteration, are employee badges issued 
and returned as employees enter or 
leave, and are all other badges kept on 
the premises always accounted for? 
8.1.2. Are there access control procedures 67 60 
defined to handle visitors, maintenance, 
service and other personnel? 
2. PROTECTION EQUIPMENT 
8.2 .. 1. Is surveillance and fire extinguishing 100 40 
equipment checked regularly? 
8.2.2. Are there readily accessible portable 100 60 (or hand-hose system) fire extinguishers 
in and around the computer facflity? 
B.2.3. Is there an alarm system with smoke 100 40 
censors and automatic fire extinguish-
ing equipment (such as water sprinklers, 
carbon dioxide, high-expansion foam, or 
Halon) located in the computer facility 
and data library or area where magnetic 
tapes, disks, and other records are 
stored? 
3 .. HOUSEKEEPING 
8.3.1. Are all accumulations of flarrmable material 100 40 
in or around the data processing site 
removed to avoid a potential fire hazard? 
I 
--
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Analysis of The Results 
Large organizations are applying most of the basic protection 
measures investigated~y the questionnaire. The access control 
procedures can be improved in some companies if the data processing 
and library centers are relocated to a building (or floor of a 
building) exclusively for their use and coded locks used (magnetic 
strips). 
Small firms can very inexpensively improve methods of 
protection in this area. As discussed earlier in the Personnel 
Section, badges are not very costly; access control procedures can 
be implew~nted without going to very sophisticated and expensive 
equipment, by using locks (combination, magnetic or regular) in the 
doors which lead to the computer center and data library. The fire 
extinguishing equipment (automatic or manual) should be checked 
regularly (following manufacturer•s specifications) to assure proper 
functioning in the event of an emergency. Some means of directing 
early fires are necessary to avoid the spreading of flames, for this 
there are smoke and heat censors available at reasonable prices. 
The removal of fl~able materials from the data processing 
and library centers is important in order to avoid a potential fire 
hazard. Carbon copies and liquid cleaners can be kept in fire-
proof storage areas (special plastic or steel cabinets). 
Data, Programs and Documentation Section 
Statement of The Problem 
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Computer applications can be manipulated by altering the input 
data or the software. 
Software are sets of instructions which are stored in the 
computer memory bank or in off-lin~ storage devices (magnetic tapes, 
disks, cards and cassettes). There are two major types of software 
used in computer systems: operating system software and user or 
application software. 
The operating system is a set of programs (generally provided 
by the hardware manufacturer) which provides 11 Services 11 to the 
computer user. The services rendered by the operating system 
software vary \'lith the .size of the computer system. Usually, most 
of these services provided are: schedule an application program, 
load scheduled progr~n(s), allocate core, disk and devices to that 
program, hand·l e all the Input/Output and interrupts. Security 
t~quirements for operating system will not be discussed in this 
report. 
The user software is designed to make the computer accomplish 
a specific application. This type of software can be developed 
in-house or bought from a comw~rcial software firm. 
Manipulation of user programs is divided into two classes: 
first, the program itself can be altered; second, the input data to 
the program can be altered or both. 
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Documentation is the means by which a current status of the 
system is described; instructions on how to operate the system, 
recovery procedures .tn- case of fa i 1 ure, testing and security 
measures should be included as part of the documentation. 
An acceptable level of security in this area can be obtained 
by the use of highly detailed and accurate procedures; operating 
instructions and documentation; programs, data and storage controls, 
and record handling procedures. 
General Guidelines 
Control and security procedures which should be included 
under data, programs and documentation are the fo~lowing: 
A. Basic controls over the accuracy of the operation may 
help to minimize erroneous operations and therefore, maintain a 
high degree of control. Some of these accuracy controls are: 
Verify data after keypunching; the verifier 
operator and the card punch operator should 
be two different persons. 
Input validation checks. 
. A quality-control function to sample the 
accuracy of data could be established. 
Errors could be analyzed by sources, type, 
quantity, magnitude, age and any other factors 
that might help to control t~em and pinpoint 
problems. 
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B. Types of data validation checks that should be 
established are: 
Charactar checks (test for numeric, alphabetic, 
special character, blanks and sign). 
Field checks (limit test, range test, valid 
item, consistency, sequence check, 
reasonableness test). 
Transaction checks (test for completeness, 
serial number checks, false punching and 
valid item). 
Batch checks (transaction count, batch 
control totals, hash totals and batch 
number checks). 
C ~ External controls by means of a control group. This 
input/output control group is the interface between the users and 
the computer operations. 
D. Data, programs and associated documentation should be 
controlled to the extent that they are available only to the 
personnel actually involved with their use and development. 
E. If the information being transmitted from one center to 
another is confidential and highly sensitive, cryptography can be 
used to prevent the unauthorized individuals from having access to 
the text. 
F~ Programs should be tested for improbable, illegal and 
impossible input. There should be a test criteria for all programs 
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depending on in1portance, function, complexity and sensitivity. 
G. Every change in any program should be authorized, 
certified and documented with no exceptions. 
H. Installation of a new program should occur only after 
thorough program and system tests have been completed and approved. 
I 
No progr~- should be accepted without adequate and complete 
documentation which has been reviewed and approved by a control 
group. 
I. The chief programmer team concept, which will tend to 
make a program module less of an individual possession, should be 
considered as a possible implementation in the programming control 
program. 
J. Better doc~~entation procedures, structured design and 
structural programming will facilitate the reading of programs and 
therefore, increase the control over programming. 
K. The security planner should consider what algorithms, 
mathematical processes or computer processing schedules are 
valuable to a competitor and protect them against any transgressor 
access. 
L. Every program documentation package should contain: 
program description, system flowchart, program flowchart, current 
compilation or assembly listing, record layouts, sample inputs/ 
outputs, operating instructions, job control cards, control access 
codes, program changes log and documentation. 
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M. Four principles that summarize a number of preventive 
rreasures are: 
The programming and operational work should 
be divided into slices handled by different 
groups. 
Only authorized programs may be run in the system. 
The computer-room hardware should be handled 
exclusively by operations personnel. 
Programmers must be fully aware that their work 
is being monitored and that audit trai 1Js .. wi 11 
make it possible to pin the blame for any 
malfunction. 
N. Standard security procedures should be established and 
made required of all computer personnel. 
Description of The Questionnaire Regarding Data 
Programs and The Docur~ntation Area 
This area was designed to collect information about data 
library procedures and access controls; use of operating 
instructions and documentation; storage facilities; data handling; 
retention and destruction processes; also logging and control over 
equipment's use. Reference Table 6. 
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TABLE 6 
DATA, PROGRAMS AND DOCUMENTATION SECTION 
COMPARISON OF RESPONSES 
-.-
QUESTION 
1. ACCESS AND CONTROL FOR DATA PROGRAMS 
E.l.l. 1. Do computer generated reports have: 
E.l.l.2. i} A cover sheet which contains job 
identification, files used, date 
and security classification? 
E.l.l.3. ii) Each page numbered sequentially? 
iii} Follow the last page of output 
with a statement signifying end 
of output, security classification 
and number of pages printed? 
E.l.2. Are there systematic procedures for the 
disposal of sensitive information? Are 
old printouts, carbon paper, tapes, 
ribbons, and documents exempted and 
shredded? 
E.l.3. Are magentic tapes, disks, documents, 
microfilms and other supplies kept in 
fire-proof and water-proof vaults and 
out of sight? 
E.1.4. Are computer forms which might be used to 
perpetrate embezzlement or fraud, such as 
continuous form checks and official 
notices, imprinted with sequential 
numbers which are recorded to control 
usage of these forms? 
E. 1.5. Is an up-to-date list of computer 
applications and programs maintained 
in catalog form? 
E.l.6. Are there controls to ensure that 
material from the data library are 
issued and delivered to authorized 
personnel only, and a library log 
maintained to ensure close control and 
prompt return of materials after use? 
0/ OF "YES II to 
LARGE SMALL 
FIRMS FIRMS 
67 
67 
33 
100 . 
100 
100 
100 
100 
40 
60 
20 
60 
50 
60 
60 
0 
50 
TABLE 6 -- Continued 
% OF 11YES'' 
ARGE SMALL 
UESTION FIRMS FIRMS 
E.1.7. Are authorized lockwords, keys, or 
encoded badges to enable the 
67 25 
operation of time-sharing, remote job entry, and other on-line terminals? 
E.l.8. As part of security measures for on-line 67 25 
systems, are reports regularly produced 
showing attempts to use invalid lock-
words and illegal procedures? 
E. 1 . 9. Where general purpose data base 100 0 
management systems are used, are 
sensitive or privileged data elements 
controlled by security codes which must 
match the user's authorization level to 
enable them to be accessed? 
E.l.lO. .Are financial and asset control systems 100 50 
transactions placed under control at 
their point of origination? 
2. LOGS AND INSTRUCTIONS 
E.2.1. Are written procedures provided to 100 60 
instruct the console operator to what 
actions are to be taken when the 
system controls and counts do not check 
out, unanticipated equipment difficulties, 
or program running problems such as 
unexplained messages or halts? 
E.2.2. Are "file protect rings" for tapes 67 0 
removed immediately after a tape is 
created and dismounted from tape drive? 
E. 2. 3. Is a rule enforc~d requiring that when 33 0 
occupied, at least two people be present 
in the data processing center? 
E.2.4. Is checking and enforcement of security 100 40 
procedures during operations designated 
as a specific responsibility of 
appropriate supervisory personnel? 
TABLE 6 -- Continued 
-- -
QUESTION 
E.2.5. Are operations on off shifts spot 
checked? Do the logs and audit 
paperwork always reflect the actual 
status? 
E.2.6. Are data received or issued by the 
data processing department logged in 
by batch showing date, time, name of 
data, quantity, from whom data were 
received and to whom it was issued? 
E.2.7. Does the console wri-tten log sheet run 
identification, setup time, processing 
start/stop time, malfunctions and down 
time? Are these logs carefully checked 
by operations supervisors for complete-
ness and accuracy, and analyzed for 
recurrent problems and anomalies? . 
E.2.8. Are data processing equipment central 
processing unit (CPU) meters 
regularly read, logged, and reviewed 
for possible unauthorized use of 
equipment? 
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% OF 11YES" 
LARGE SMALL 
FIRMS FIRMS 
67 25 
33 20 
67 20 
100 60 
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Analysis of The Results 
Both large and small companies should increase the usage 
of cover sheets (contalning job identification, security 
classification, date, files used), sequentially numbered pages and 
a last page (signifying end of output, total number of pages, and 
security classification) in order to improve controls over theft of 
information. 
To obtain information from the system or change existing 
data, it is necessary to have access to the system. If access to 
the system is to be limited to authorized personnel only, then 
authorized lockwords, keys or encoded badges should be used to 
enable the operation of time-sharing, remote job entry terminals. 
It is important to have reports that show att~mpts to use 
invalid keywords and illegal procedures, this information will alert 
the security officer of possible threats and the code or keyword 
designer with a measure of the user's difficulty in using the pass-
words or codes . 
It should be a policy that at least two people be in the 
computer center when this is in operation. If an accident occurs 
one person can help the other and moreover, it is harder to alter 
data or steal information if someone else is present. 
The data received and issued by the data processing department 
should be logged in by showing date, name, quantity, from whom data 
was received and to whom it was issued. This procedure will augment 
the degree of control. The unauthorized use of equipment can be 
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detected and controlled by checking regularly the CPU meters and 
reviewing the ··console written log. 
Backup Sectio~ 
Statement of The Problem 
\1\vt ~~·ct, A failu·re iri hardware, software or personnel is to be 
expected. Failures and errors are inevitable in the operation of 
any computer system, therefore, the security planner, systems 
analysts and management should plan on how to handle the computer 
operations when failure occurs. 
Most companies cannot afford operational shutdowns; the 
business may come to a halt ~ moreover the computer downtime can be 
very expensive and may cause costly delays in accomplishing some 
critical functions. 
Backup operations may take place on-site when there is only a 
. 
partial loss of capability but may require one or more off-site 
locations when there has been major damage or destruction. 
The emergency procedures necessary when a failure occurs vary 
with the type of equipment and its use in the operation. Neverthe-
less, some general procedures can be stated. Security in this area 
may be obtained by the careful planning and coordination of backup 
facilities, interruptions and failure recovery procedures. 
General Guidelines 
Backup resources should be available when needed. Some 
general principles to provide backup facilities are: 
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A. An effective planning approach should include an 
appraisal of each individual piece of equipment and the effects 
of its failure in the -overall processing system; followed by laying 
out a plan for an alternate method of processing. 
B. An equipment feasibility study should balance the need 
for backup equipment with the requirements of financial reality. 
C. Backup equipment should not be located in the same site 
because the same disaster can cripple both the principal and backup 
equipment. 
D. It is important that approved security procedures 
continue in force, even if the data processing center is 
functioning under emergency operations. 
E. It may be advisable to explore having available 
electrical power backup, temporary power source, an independent 
air conditioning backup and trained personnel backup. 
F. Assurance that compatible backup facilities will be 
available during a crisis is a very critical point. Identical 
hardware is not sufficient to assume that both systems configurations 
are the same. 
G. A written agreement should be signed by officials of 
both companies that are involved in an agreement to exchange backup 
fa ci 1 i ties . 
H. If a satisfactory backup contract cannot be worked out 
with a computer service bureau or a nearby compatible data 
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processing center, then it may be necessary to go to the additional 
expense to maintain redundant systems. 
I. Data preparation facilities, proper forms and other data 
media should be considered in the overall backup plan. 
are: 
J. Some basic guidelines to stretch the 'backup facilities 
Postpone less urgent tasks. 
Substitute other procedures. 
Modify tasks to reduce run time. 
K. Each backup plan should cover these five basic areas: 
Performance specifications (performance of each 
· task will depart from normal). 
User instructions (emergency procedures, what to do). 
Technical requirements for each data processing task 
(documentation of operational requirements for each 
task). 
Computer system specifications (terms and cost of 
backup use, location of the system, schedule of 
availability for backup operation, and the tentative 
schedule of ADP tasks to be performed on the system). 
Administrative information (special personnel 
assignments and procedures, temporary employment, 
use of special messengers and other departures 
from normal). 
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, L. A recovery planning program should be started once the 
damages have been calculated and basic requirements have been 
defined (floor space to house the ADP facility, ADP hardware, 
supplies and utilities). 
,·M •. The security planner may propose some types of insurance 
coverage and management will decide what to do. Some types of 
insurance coverage are: equipme-nt and facilities; sto~age media 
and its contents; loss due to business interruption; extra expense 
at a backup site; valuable papers and records; malpractice, 
including human errors and omissions. 
Description of The Questionnaire Concerning The Backup Area 
. Equipment backup and fallback, contingency plans, agreements 
with the backup site and protection of support facilities are 
considered in this section as in Table 7. 
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TABLE 7 
BACKUP SECTION COMPARISON OF RESPONSES 
---
% OF 11 YES n 
LARGE -sMAlL 
QUESTION FIRMS FIRMS 
1 . BACKUP AND FALLBACK 
1 . 1 . Have contingency plans and priorities been 
developed and tested out for the handling 
of computer shutdowns for a period of: 
1 . 1 . 1 . i) 1-3 days 33 20 
1.1.2. ii) 1 week 0 0 
1. 1 . 3. iii) 2 weeks 0 0 
1.1.4. iv) more than two weeks 0 0 
1. 2. Is backup computer equipment configuration 67 40 
checked often for changes and alterations 
that could affect compatibility for backup 
purposes? 
1 . 3. Is it realistic to expect that appropriate 67 40 
data processing equipment can be made 
available at time of need in quantity 
sufficient to enable near normal 
functioning? 
. 1. 4. Are there adequate physical damage 100 20 
protections ·for support facilities external 
to the building such as: air conditioning, 
telephone, electric power and water? J 
1. 5. Have procedures for operating at the backup 67 0 
site been documented? 
1.6. Does the agreement with the backup site 
cover: 
1 .6. 1. i) Physical access by your operations 67 20 
people? 
1.6.2. ii) Priorities, in the event you are 
dynamically sharing their equipment? 
67 20 
1.6.3. iii) Charges for services received? 33 0 
1.6.4. iv) Assignable locked storage for holding 33 0 
your classified materials? 
1.6.5. 
1. 7. 
I 
TABLE 7 -- Continued 
QUESTION 
- -
v) Use of telephones & office areas? 
Are the costs of maintaining portability 
of applications and compatibility of I 
computer systems included in your 
regular budget? 
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.% OF "YES 11 
LARGE SMALL I 
FIRMS FIRMS 
33 20 I 
100 20 I 
I 
I 
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Analysis of The Results 
It can be noticed from the results obtained that contingency 
plans have not been developed and properly tested out. Both large 
and small organizations must improve in this area in order to avoid 
a complete halt of operations for several days. 
It is not sufficient to expect that compatible backup 
equipment will be available when needed. More than just one 
facility should be available. Also, a signed contract should exist 
\ 
specifying the cost for services, the amount of time available, 
storage, telephone and office areas, access and any other special 
procedures. 
The protection for support facilities will change from zone 
to zone. The. Orlando area is within a critical zone of tornadoes 
and thunderstorms. 
It is important to analyze how thes·e events wi 11 affect the 
performance of the equipment and how much backup or protective 
measures are required. 
Program Development Section 
Statement of The Problem 
The data processing security planner and his staff can 
identify a set of remedial measures which appear to be the most 
effective against all threats, but all they can do is recommend 
this group of remedial measures. It is up to management to 
approve what actions should be taken. 
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I 
Two phases of security are: the responsibility for the 
design of security techniques and procedures, and the responsibility 
for the day-to-day -operations given that design. In both areas the 
overall responsibility lies with management. 
Data processing management (and the security staff) should be 
aware that it is their duty to maintain top management informed 
of the organization's vulnerability if a disaster should strike its 
computer system. 
Top management should see that an overall strategy for 
security is established and that the security procedures are 
strictly enforced. 
General Guidelines 
Some procedures and management actions are necessary to 
maintain a sound security program, such as: 
A. Inforn1ation such as that which follows should be made 
available to management: 
Significant threats and probabilities of 
occurrence. 
Critical tasks an~ the loss of potential 
related to each threat. 
A list of remedial measures which will 
yield the greatest net reduction in losses, 
together with their annual cost. 
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B. The responsibilities for secure design should be 
divided. One possible way is: 
Overall -coordination 
. Technical design 
• 
• 
Procedural controls 
Controls on programs and programmers 
Physical security 
External administrative controls 
Auditors 
C. The responsibilities for maintaining security of 
day-to-day operations may be divided as follows: 
Data-processing manager 
Security administrator 
Local security officers 
File owners 
Line managers 
Auditors 
All staff 
D. Management should enforce security procedures that will 
ensure the integrity and accuracy of the data required to plan 
and control the enterprise, provide for the privacy of proprietary, 
personal, privileged or otherwise sensitive data, and protect 
and conserve the organization•s assets from natural disasters, 
man made hazards, vandalisms and theft. 
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E. The strategy for security should be a sound, continuing 
one, not, as has often been the case, one based on passing fashion 
or reactions to emergencies. 
Description of The Questionnaire Related To The 
Program Development Area 
This section deals with the design and implementation of 
computer programs and control procedures. It also includes a set 
of questions about the· documentation included in each program and 
regulations such as: audit trails, information loss, error 
detection and balances. This information is detailed in Table 8. 
1 • 
1 • 1 . 
1. 2. 
1. 3. 
1. 4. 
1. 5. 
1.5.1. 
1.5.2. 
1. 5. 3 
1.5.4. 
1.5.5. 
1.5.6. 
1.5.7. 
1 . 5. 8. 
1.5.9. 
1.5.10. 
TABLE 8 
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT SECTION 
· COMPARISON OF RESPONSES 
. . -
QUESTION 
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURES 
Are .systems audit and control procedures 
for new systems designs put through a 
formal approval process by the internal 
audit department? 
With regard to. programming, are logic 
reviews conducted with a programming 
manager or another programmer to minimize 
the probability of undetected logic errors 
that could crop up during live systems 
operations? 
Are there established standards that 
specify the internal construction and 
programming techniques to be used for 
secure application programs? 
Is program certification performed under 
the surveillance of an internal auditing 
or quality assurance group administra~ 
tively separate from the programmers 
who performed the coding? 
Does the documentation package include 
for each program: 
i) Program description? 
ii) System flowchart? 
iii) Current compilation or assembly 
listing? 
iv) Record 1 ayouts? 
v) Sample input/output? 
vi) Operating instructions? 
vii) Job control cards? 
viii) Program changes (date,description, 
approva 1) 
ix) Control access codes? 
x) Duplicate documentation stored 
off-premises? 
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% OF 11 YES" 
LARGE SMALL 
FIRMS FIRMS 
100 33 
100 50 
67 20 
67 0 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
100 100 
100 0 
100 67 
67 100 
100 100 
67 0 ' 
33 33 
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TABLE 8 - Continued 
% OF 11 YES II 
LARGE SMALL 
QUEST-ION FIRMS I FIRMS 
1.6 .. Are one or more individuals on the 100 25 
internal audit staff capable of 
interpreting program coding and 
writing basic programs? 
Are there appropriate techniques for: 
1.7.1. i) Proper sequencing? 100 40 
1.7.2. ii) Batch totals? 100 80 
1.7.3. iii) Record counts? 100 40 
1 . 7. 4. i v) Transaction completeness? 33 40 
1.7.5. v) Tests for minimum and maximum 33 20 
values? 
1.7.6. vi) Error-checking and control 100 40 
routines for input validity? 
1.7.7. vii) Exception reporting where arith~ 67 20 
metic data on file exceeds 
predetermined customary range? 
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Analysis of The Results 
It is vital ·to maintain control over the computer programs in 
order to prevent fr~a_url or embezzlement. The results show that small 
companies do not exercise enough regulation over the internal 
construction of computer programs and the certification of these by 
an internal audit or a quality assurance group. 
Both, large and small companies should increase their control 
over computer programs. Most of the incidents (stealing of money 
or other assets) have occurred because of the lack of appropriate 
controls. 
Improvement in the areas of predefined customer ranges and 
exception reporting system is necessary to detect drastic changes 
from the customary actions. 
System and operational documentation is necessary for 
recovery in case of a disaster. 
The results show low usage of off-premises storage of 
documentation. 
Record counts and transaction completeness are important 
factors in the accuracy of the system; this is another area that 
should become better controlled. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
As is stated in International Business Machines 
Corporation, Data Processing Division 1974, p.l: 
With the greater use of computers, security has taken 
on new importance, a different dimension. More of your 
working information is stored in the system. You are more 
dependent on this single source for collected information. 
And this concentration of assets in one spot increases 
their vulnerability. So it is to your advantage to know 
how to protect your computer and its environment. 
It is very important to understand the role that 
security plays in computer systems in order to dedicate 
the necessary resources to the development of efficient 
protective measures. 
It is unfortunate that( "Computer Security •.. the Imperative 
Nuisance .. , 1974, p.24): 
To many executives, security means an elderly, gray-
haired guard sleeping out his semi-retirement at a factory 
door, silver tape around the windows and a fire extinguisher 
hanging in the hall. Nobody likes to think about security. 
No one wants to believe it.•s really needed. 
These two ideas summarize the l c~ncepts that were desired to 
discuss in the process of writing this r:'eport •. 
Automatic data processing security, privacy and confi-
dentially problems have introduced serious stresses to management 
and the computer practitioner. It is the responsibility of these 
people to ensure that a firm•s privacy and assets are protected 
against malefactors. Instead of finding that some minimum 
standards of security have been required in all firms, it has been 
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found that the remedial measures differ markedly in their 
popularity of use. 
If more proficient security systems are to be used, it ~ s 
necessary to define some basic areas that need to be controlled 
and design basic protective, preventive and detection measures , ~ 1 l 
In this study, five areas have been presented (personnef , -4 
physical, backup, development, data, programs. and documentation) 
and the design and implementation of general countermeasures 
defined. 
Basic concepts were defined and can be summarized as follows: 
Privacy is a property of individuals. Confidentiality 
is a property of data. Security is a property possessed 
by hardware and software systems· and facilities. 
(Davis 1974, p.23). 
As has been discussed, there is not a set of solutions that 
will solve everybody•s security problems. A procedure however, 
has been suggested for developing and implementing a security 
program. These steps are: 
Analyze risk as the basis for development of a 
security policy (audit and appraise the potential 
security exposure). 
Select and implement appropriate security 
measures to reduce exposure to losses. 
Develop contingency plans for back~ap operation, 
disaster recovery and emergencies. 
• 
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Provide indoctrination and-~raining for personnel . 
Plan and conduct continuing tests and audits and 
adjust security measures and contingency plans as 
needed. 
It must be emphasized that the effective use and design of 
security procedures will depend upon steps taken by management. 
All concerned must be convinced of management•s deter-
mination to see that the security measures are conscientiously 
executed and appropriately followed · !Up. \ 
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QUESTION NUMBERS 
Fig. 11. Summary of Results, 
Physical Section Small Organizations 
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